Despite allegations he was pro-Western, Yamamoto worked hard to understand Western technological, political, and military superiority. Yamamoto graduated in spring and was appointed gunnery specialist. Officially commended for bravery, Yamamoto began his ascent through naval ranks. Upon graduation, he received further promotions, and by , Lieutenant Commander Yamamoto was sent to study at Harvard. Japanese officers in the West were expected to bring back information on their host countries, so Yamamoto spent much of his free time touring the US and studying its industry and resources, especially oil.
Japan was responsible for delivering the peoples of Asia from Western oppression, and Imperial territorial expansion was a prerequisite. Yamamoto favored a different strategy; a US war would be a dire mistake and Japan should work for international collaboration and to end imperialism.
This debate culminated with civilians and proponents of international collaboration losing control of the nation. In , he was promoted to captain and was assigned command of the cruiser Fuji. Upon returning to Japan, he was appointed commander of the new aircraft carrier Akagi, flagship of the Japanese aircraft carrier fleet. In the s, Japan acquiesced to Western arms limitation agreements but increased its aggression toward China.
Building upon its earlier annexation of Korea, Japan pressured Manchuria and northern China until they succumbed. Even before the financial crisis, most military personnel opposed Western-style parliamentary government, and budget limitations on military expenditures, and felt Western lifestyles were an affront to traditional Japanese values.
In January , the London Naval Conference met to negotiate a disarmament treaty, with Yamamoto attending as a military adviser. Japan opposed the terms set in Washington a ratio of five battleships or carriers each for the USN and the RN to every three ships allowed for the IJN and demanded it be raised to , a ratio that would grant it security but not threaten the US or UK. US Secretary of State Henry Stimson was eventually persuaded that this new ratio should be implemented for destroyers and cruisers with submarine ratios being equal for the three powers.
In the case of large ships, the ratio remained. Japanese military leaders quickly escalated their attacks on civilian politicians during the s. On the night of September 18, , Japanese army officers alleged that Chinese soldiers had blown up a small section of the Japanese railway in southern Manchuria.
The Japanese army stationed in Manchuria used this accusation to quickly take all of Manchuria. The civilian politicians were helpless in the face of support for the action in Manchuria supported by the Tokyo high command. Yamamoto, now a rear admiral, could not ignore these events. But, in his new position, he was not actively commanding any naval forces. Yamamoto developed, a decade before the West, an air fleet concept, based on establishing an aerial force capable of operating from land bases against naval targets, that could be placed on carriers if needed.
In , Yamamoto was appointed commander of the First Carrier Division, overseeing two carriers and several battleships. His fellow IJN officer—just like their Western counterparts—still considered the battleship the primary naval weapon. Undaunted, Yamamoto demanded that six carriers must be employed in order to achieve a decisive tactical effect. Preparing his forces for war but not hoping for one, despite threats, Yamamoto stuck to his opinions that war against the economically powerful US would be suicide for Japan.
In , Yamamoto was appointed vice admiral and was an adviser in another naval conference in London. Recognizing that more discussions were fruitless, Yamamoto left England to tour Europe but refused to meet with Hitler and disapproved of a possible Japanese pact with the dictator.
Still, he kept his opinions to himself, and leading naval commanders believed they controlled Yamamoto. Another promotion occurred in August , when Yamamoto was appointed head of the recently established permanent Combined Fleet. As the Pacific campaign began, the Combined Fleet became synonymous with the IJN because of its large numbers of battleships, aircraft carriers, and aerial forces.
In November , he was promoted to admiral. Allied actions included an embargo on oil and metal exports, closing the Panama Canal to Japanese vessels and freezing assets, but the sanctions caused Japanese military leaders to plan an escape from dependency on the West through the capture of resource-rich European colonies in Southeast Asia.
On March 21, , a major offensive against Allied positions in the Somme River region of France began with five hours of bombardment from more Sign up now to learn about This Day in History straight from your inbox. Just after 6 p. On this day in , German forces in the throes of a major spring offensive on the Western Front launch a renewed attack on Allied positions between the Somme and Avre Rivers. In it, he says that there is a common link forming between the civil rights and In the dream, Lincoln asked a soldier standing guard President William Henry Harrison dies after serving only 32 days in office on this day in Harrison holds the unfortunate presidential record of shortest term in office.
Ironically, the man with the shortest White House tenure delivered the longest inaugural address in Louis, Missouri. On August 30, , Navy Minister Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa promoted Yamamoto to commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet commenting, "It was the only way to save his life—send him off to sea. Following the signing of the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, Yamamoto warned Premier Fumimaro Konoe that if he were forced to fight the United States, he expected to have success for no more than six months to a year.
After that time, nothing was guaranteed. With war almost unavoidable, Yamamoto began planning for the fight. Going against traditional Japanese naval strategy, he advocated a quick first strike to cripple the Americans followed by an offensive-minded "decisive" battle.
Such an approach, he argued, would increase Japan's chances of victory and might make the Americans willing to negotiate peace. Promoted to admiral on November 15, , Yamamoto anticipated losing his command with the ascension of General Hideki Tojo to prime minister in October Though old adversaries, Yamamoto retained his position due to his popularity in the fleet and connections to the imperial family.
As diplomatic relations continued to break down, Yamamoto began planning his strike to destroy the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor , Hawaii, while also outlining plans for drives into the resource-rich Dutch East Indies and Malaya. Domestically, he continued to push for naval aviation and opposed the construction of the Yamato -class super-battleships, as he felt they were a waste of resources.
With the Japanese government set on war, six of Yamamoto's carriers sailed for Hawaii on November 26, Approaching from the north they attacked on December 7, sinking four battleships and damaging an additional four—beginning World War II. While the attack was a political disaster for the Japanese due to the United States' desire for revenge, it provided Yamamoto with six months as he anticipated to consolidate and expand their territory in the Pacific without American interference.
Following the triumph at Pearl Harbor, Yamamoto's ships and planes proceeded to mop up Allied forces across the Pacific. Surprised by the speed of the Japanese victories, the Imperial General Staff IGS began to ponder competing plans for future operations. While Yamamoto argued in favor of seeking a decisive battle with the American fleet, the IGS preferred to move toward Burma.
Knowing that Midway was key to the defense of Hawaii, Yamamoto hoped to draw the American fleet out so that it could be destroyed. Moving east with a large force, including four carriers, while also sending a diversionary force to the Aleutians, Yamamoto was unaware that the Americans had broken his codes and were informed about the attack. After bombing the island, his carriers were struck by U.
Navy aircraft flying from three carriers. The defeat at Midway blunted Japanese offensive operations and shifted the initiative to the Americans. Despite the heavy losses at Midway, Yamamoto sought to press forward with operations to take Samoa and Fiji. Entirely fought by aircraft, it was the first sea battle in history in which no warship of either side ever saw an enemy craft. Tactically, the battle was a Japanese victory, for they had sunk the carrier Lexington and two smaller warships.
Yet Japan lost the carrier Shoho , saw severe damage to the carrier Shokaku , and experienced the loss of most of the Zuikaku's planes. The Japanese commander, Vice Admiral Inouye Shigeyoshi, deprived of most of his striking power in aircraft, withdrew. His failure to pursue the damaged Yorktown drew Yamamoto's ire, though Inouye had little choice.
Strategically, the Coral Sea marked a U. Furthermore, Yamamoto was served notice that despite U. Seeking retribution for the Doolittle raid, Yamamoto decided to draw out what was left of the U. Pacific Fleet in a decisive battle. The capture of Midway Island, a coral atoll six miles in diameter and a U.
Furthermore, so Yamamoto believed, the strike would draw out the fullest strength of the U. Pacific Fleet. He would establish a lethal ambush, one that would destroy the carriers that had escaped him at Pearl Harbor. Once Midway was seized, Hawaii would be invaded, forcing the U. Conversely, Yamamoto believed that if Japan did not soon engage in a decisive sea battle, its defeat was simply a matter of time.
In a sense, Midway was his last chance. Yamamoto assembled the largest fleet in the history of Japanese naval warfare—some ships, among them 11 battleships, 8 carriers, 22 cruisers, 65 destroyers, and 21 submarines. Also involved were some planes and , naval personnel. On the surface, Yamamoto's strategy was extremely sophisticated, perhaps too much so. He divided his fleet into widely separated groups. A northern force, including two carriers, would capture Kiska and Attu, islands at the western end of the Aleutians.
This strike would not only divert attention from the main target, Midway, it would keep American forces from using the islands as stepping stones to Japan. He planned to withdraw Japanese forces from the islands before the grueling winter.
The bombing of Dutch Harbor would cause even further diversion. An advance force of Japanese submarines, patrolling west of Hawaii, would warn of any U.
Twenty-four hours after the Aleutian strike, Admiral Nagumo's striking force of four large carriers would hit Midway from the northwest, followed the next day by Vice Admiral Kondo Nobutake's second fleet of two battleships, a small aircraft carrier, half a dozen heavy cruisers, and an invasion convoy. As the main strength of the American fleet lay in Hawaiian or Australian waters so the Japanese believed , the strike on Midway would be a complete surprise.
Once Midway was captured, the remnants of the U. But by then the Japanese would have the advantage of position as well as at least a advantage in carriers and four to five times the number of screening vessels. At that point, Yamamoto himself would lead the combined fleet's main force, a powerful unit of seven battleships that included the two largest in the world then or since: his flagship Yamato and her sister ship, the Musashi.
While he would be shutting the jaws of a gigantic trap, the northern force would come from the Aleutians to cut off the U.
Notes Layton:. His intricate battle choreography also required that his opponents move according to predicted positions; one false step or foreknowledge of the plan could throw the entire operation into disarray. In the battle, which took place from June 4 to 6, , Yamamoto operated under many disadvantages. Thanks to American cryptographers, the Japanese sailed into a trap.
Some Japanese ships had even mentioned their destination by name, and on May 20 a lengthy order of Yamamoto himself was intercepted. By the last week of May, the United States knew the date, place, and time of operation, as well as the composition of the Japanese forces. Yamamoto's submarines were ordered to report on the presence of American carriers, but they arrived on station 25 minutes too late to do so.
Yamamoto's operations officer had information pointing to the presence of a powerful U. By maintaining radio silence on his flagship, Yamamoto was unable to give instructions when needed. Not a single senior admiral had been fully briefed; all were drawn into combat on the shortest of notice. Nagumo failed to order an immediate attack once he learned of U. In the ensuing battle, no surface ships sighted each other or exchanged gunfire. The devastating exchanges were carried out entirely by aircraft at long ranges.
Three American carriers unexpectedly appeared, the Enterprise, Hornet, and Yorktown —the last ship fresh from hasty repairs. Within ten minutes, they sank three Japanese carriers— Kaga, Akagi, and Soryu — that comprised close to half of Japan's entire carrier tonnage. The remaining Japanese carrier Hiryu successfully sunk the Yorktown, but later in the day it was hit by the Enterprise. A particularly crucial turning point took place when Nagumo, having learned that his initial air strike did not succeed in critically damaging Midway, decided to use his reserve planes in a second strike.
While his carrier crews were in the act of changing from torpedoes to bombs, his force found itself suddenly exposed to the carrier-based planes of the U. Yamamoto himself took no part in the battle until it was too late. He wanted to engage the Americans with his battleships, and in a desperate move sought the daylight bombing of Midway. Yet not being able to bring his scattered groups together on time, he feared further losses and withdrew.
Only Americans died compared to 3, Japanese.
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